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Abstract:
Europe created the model of embedded international courts (IC), where domestic judges work with
international judges to interpret and apply international legal rules that are also part of national legal
orders. This model has now diffused around the world. This article documents the spread of
European-style ICs: there are now eleven operational copies of the European Court of Justice (ECJ),
three copies of the European Court of Human Rights, and a handful of additional ICs that use
Europe’s embedded approach to international law. After documenting the spread of European-style
ICs, the article then explains how two regions chose European style ICs, yet varied from the ECJ
model.
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This article is motivated by an observation-- the global spread of European style international
courts (ICs). Up until the creation of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of
Human Rights, international courts were primarily designed to adjudicate disputes between states
when both parties desired. With consent required for litigation to proceed, governments could
simply refuse to litigate cases where serious issues were at stake. The architects of the European
Community and the European Human Rights systems, however, wanted meaningful international
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oversight of state behaviour. They added design features to make international oversight
possible, including compulsory jurisdiction so that states could not block valid cases from
proceeding and the right of nonstate actors to initiate litigation. These design features, and others,
have been copied. There are now eleven operational copies of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) and three adaptations of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The larger claim
of this article, however, is that Europe’s most important legal export is not so much its formal
legal institutions, but rather the embedded approach to making international law effective.
European-style ICs exist where international legal rules are part of national legal orders, and
where national and international judges mutually converse about the application of these rules in
concrete cases. Because supra and sub-national actors are applying the same or similar law to
concrete cases, European style ICs are generally perceived to be better able to work with
domestic lawyers, administrative actors and judges to facilitate the domestic application of
international law than are inter-state courts.
The article begins with the creation of the innovative yet largely unused ECtHR and ECJ.
I return to this history to show that despite their revolutionary designs, neither court was
particularly active or effective in their early years. I briefly describe how Europe created its
system of embedded international law through practice. Focusing on emulation of the ECJ
model, I show how regional integration systems in Latin American and Africa have emulated the
ECJ while adapting certain features to protect national sovereignty. I then examine comparative
litigation data, which suggests that most ECJ emulators are at this point similar to the early ECJ;
a dearth of secondary legislation combines with limited support from national judges to inhibit
litigation.
We lack detailed histories about the creation of most ICs, which makes explaining ECJ
emulation difficult. I briefly report on the findings of my research on the Community Courts for
the Organization for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa and the Economic Community
of West African States. In these and other cases I have studied, policy-makers were drawing
lessons from Europe while adapting the ECJ model to accommodate state concerns and to fit the
particular needs of regional actors.
The conclusion argues that the existence of ECJ copies means that we can now hold
constant the design of a court to investigate what makes different international courts more and
less active and effective. But if the argument of this paper is correct, we should not focus too
2

much on the fact of institutional copying. We should instead investigate the conditions that lead
national lawyers, administrators and judges to be willing to work with international judges to
apply international legal rules in the national legal order.

Creating European-Style ICs Through Practice
The ECJ and the ECtHR were from inception unusual in that they both included
compulsory international oversight of state actions (Levi 1976: 70-1). The motivation that led to
the ECJ and ECtHR’s unique designs in itself created permissive conditions allowing for the
ECtHR and ECJ systems to be transformed through practice. The Nazi empire and World War II
made Europeans suspicious about unfettered German power and about powerful political
institutions—even democratic institutions—lacking meaningful legal and political checks.
Created in the 1950s, Europe’s supranational legal systems were intended as partial remedies for
unchecked power.
The European Human Rights system was meant to be a supranational check on state
respect for human rights (Madsen et al. 2005). In contrast to the nonbinding United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights (adopted in
1950) was legally binding. Also different was that in ratifying the European Convention, every
member of the Council of Europe agreed to allow a European Commission on Human Rights to
investigate complaints about human rights violations. A number of countries feared, however,
that a highly independent international oversight mechanism would compromise national
sovereignty and that “the supremacy of national courts would be degraded if an international
organ would be permitted to criticize their judicial decisions” (Schermers 1999: 822). Thus the
Commission’s formal mandate prioritized friendly reconciliation over enforcement actions
(Robertson et al. 1994: 5-12, 295-296). Also, consent to the authority of the ECtHR and to the
right of individual appeals to the European Commission on Human Rights were made optional,
with states allowed to opt in for a few years at a time. For the first two decades of its existence,
key European states refused to accept the Court’s compulsory authority and even those that
accepted the Court’s authority at times threatened to withdraw their support (Bates 2011: 238283).
Europe’s other approach to international law enforcement was its Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC). The ECSC was meant to ensure that Germany did not use its market
3

dominance in coal and steel to favour German reconstruction over reconstruction in other
countries (Gillingham 1991). The ECJ, created in 1952 as part of the ECSC, was designed to
provide a legal check on the ECSC High Authority (Boerger-De Smedt 2008). The ECJ had
compulsory jurisdiction and private access so that individuals could challenge arguably illegal
High Authority actions. The ECSC system also had a novel preliminary ruling mechanism that
allowed national judges to send legal questions to the ECJ so that the ECJ could help national
judges interpret technical ECSC rules (Pescatore 1981). Member-states retained these basic
design elements when ECSC institutions were adapted for the goal of the European Economic
Community (EEC). While the newly christened EEC Commission lost its authority to rule itself
on state or firm compliance with European rules, the ECJ remained the final arbiter of state
compliance with Community rules. The ECJ’s oversight authority was not optional, and in this
respect the legal apparatus of the EEC reflected a greater self-binding commitment compared to
the Council of Europe’s human rights system. But the EEC legal system was not very muscular
either. Non-compliance cases could result in the ECJ declaring that a member state had “failed
to fulfil its obligations” under the Treaty of Rome. Such a declaration was largely toothless in
that no remedies were associated with an ECJ finding of a violation of European law.
Despite their revolutionary designs, in the 1950s and 1960s both of Europe’s
supranational courts were barely used. Worried that too much law enforcement might keep
European states from consenting to the ECtHR’s authority, the European Commission on Human
Rights limited to types of cases it referred to the ECtHR. Between 1954 and 1961, 1307
applications were filed with the Commission of which only 7 were declared admissible—a
success rate of one half of one percent (Schermers 1999: 825). The ECJ heard more than seven
cases, but according to Stuart Scheingold the role of the ECJ in the ECSC remained quite
limited. Especially after the defeat of the European Defence Community Treaty in 1954, more
disputes were resolved through out of court negotiation and the ECJ focused on procedural issues
avoiding entering the political fray where possible (Scheingold 1965: 265-6). In the 1950s and
early 1960s the ECJ developed precedents and facilitated procedural regularity, but it was unable
to help stem violations of ECSC rules or to promote the actual creation of a common market in
coal and steel (Alter 2009: chapter 3).
Graph 1 suggests that Europe’s supranational courts took years to reach their potential. In
their first years of operation, neither the ECJ (founded in 1953) nor the ECtHR (founded in
4

1959) were very active. The larger question, however, is whether the legal regimes contributed to
greater respect for legal rules they oversaw? While one can find doctrinally significant decisions,
it is hard to find a substantively important ECJ or ECtHR ruling from the early period, which
explains why few people considered Europe’s supranational courts as very important in the
1960s or even the 1970s.
Graph 1: Litigation Rates over time in the ECJ and ECtHR (Founding-2009)

I repeat this early history for three reasons. First, this history reminds us that sovereignty
concerns for many years affected the design and operation of Europe’s supranational
commissions and courts. Second, this history reminds us even for ICs operating in democratic
contexts, with independent and robust domestic rule of law systems, where the norms the ICs
were asked to enforce overlap significantly with the norms and values of national governments
and domestic populations, drafting bold IC charters is not enough to make ICs independent and
effective in practice. Third, this history is relevant today because most ECJ and ECtHR copies
are operating in contexts that are very similar to Europe of the 1950s and 1960s. Scheingold
(1965) saw the weakness of the ECSC High Authority and the lack of state commitment to the
integration process as fundamental limits on the ECJ’s ability to develop a rule of law. This is
exactly the situation of ECJ copies in Africa and Latin America.
Litigants, lawyers and judges helped to transform Europe’s supranational courts through
5

practice. The ECJ’s bold doctrines regarding the direct effect and the supremacy of European
law, which authorized litigants to invoke European rules in front of national judges and made
national judges co-enforcers of Community law, helped to build a constitutional federal legal
order at a time when the political process of integration was largely paralyzed (Weiler 1991 ;
Stein 1981). Litigation rates and the political import of ECJ rulings rose as European member
states passed secondary implementing legislation to build a common market, giving litigants
legal texts worth invoking, engaging national administrations and judges in enforcing European
law, and giving the ECJ a platform upon which to build integration promoting jurisprudence
(Stone Sweet 2004: 59). Changing attitudes also mattered. In the 1980s European governments
once again embraced the goal of completing the Single Market, because market integration was
seen as a way to help European industries build global competitiveness (Hanson 1998). In the
human rights system, by “1993 there was no longer a reasonable risk that member states would
not renew the right of individual petition or that they would withdraw from the Convention.
Public opinion in the member states and the Council of Europe would not easily accept such a
step” (Schermers 1999: 825). Through living with active and engaged supranational courts,
Europeans grew to accept, if not always appreciate, the contributions of the ECJ and ECtHR to
European politics. In the 1980s and 1990s member states embraced the court’s legal revolutions,
adopting institutional reforms aimed at reinforcing the existing systems. The European
Community added a Tribunal of First Instance and system of sanctions to use against states that
ignored ECJ rulings. The Council of Europe gave private actors direct access to the ECtHR,
making the right of individual appeal and ECtHR jurisdiction compulsory for all Council of
Europe members.
The slow transformation of Europe’s supranational legal mechanisms showed the world
that combining domestic enforcement with international legal oversight contributes to making
international law more effective (Helfer et al. 1997 ; Hathaway 2005). Europe also showed the
world that robust international legal oversight can co-exist with important national values such as
democracy, dealing with security threats, and respecting heterogeneous national values.

Spreading European Style Courts through Institutional Emulation
This section documents emulation of the EU’s legal institution. The fact of legal
emulation is not surprising. When faced with an institutional problem, lawyers typically look
6

around the world for examples of how other legal systems have dealt with the issue. The result is
a remarkable similarity in the formal structure of law and legal systems (Watson 1993). The
earliest emulations of the ECJ were by the Benelux countries (1974) and the Andean Pact (1984).
Both the Benelux and Andean decisions to emulate the EEC legal system makes sense when one
considers that the alternative of the time was the GATT dispute resolution system, which in the
1970s was pretty much defunct.1 By the 1990s, institutional emulators had a larger choice set.
They could emulate the ECJ or the compulsory dispute settlement system of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), or create their own amalgam. Since most members of regional integration
systems are current or aspiring members of the WTO, the WTO’s compulsory system is for many
countries a default system for resolving trade disputes.
The GATT/WTO system has compulsory jurisdiction and the right for states to initiate
non-compliance suits against other states. Four international economic systems emulate the
WTO dispute resolution system—the North American Free Trade Area (created 1992), Economic
Community of the Commonwealth of Independent States (created 1992), Southern Common
Market (Mercosur, created 2004) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Dispute Resolution Mechanism (created 2004). The ECJ model adds 1) a supranational
Commission that monitors state compliance and brings non-compliance cases to the
supranational court; 2) a preliminary ruling mechanism that allows national courts to send
references to the supranational court; 3) systems of administrative and constitutional review that
allow states, community institutions and private litigants to challenge community acts in front of
the supranational court. Table 1 identifies eleven operational ICs that copy at least two features
of the ECJ model. This list of operating ECJ emulators is conservative. There are also two
proposed ECJ-style African courts2 and proposals to convert the Economic Court for the
Commonwealth of Independent States and the Mercosur system into ECJ style legal systems.
There are also three emulations of the European human rights system, which is pretty much the
only model of an international human rights court to choose from.3 And there are ICs that do not
1

The GATT system required state parties to consent for a case to proceed and before any panel finding would be made
binding, and in the 1970s Europe and the United States were blocking most cases from proceeding (Hudec 1993: 29-42).
2
The proposed African Court of Justice may allow a supranational commission to initiate enforcement actions, and it
may have administrative and constitutional review authority. The draft charter of the Court of Justice of the Economic
Community of Central African States allows Conference of Heads of State to initiate noncompliance suits, and it
envisions preliminary rulings and administrative and constitutional review cases.
3
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (created in 1979) and African Court of Peoples and Human Rights (created
in 2006) emulate the original ECtHR, where a Commission investigates complaints and serves as a gate-keeper to the
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directly copy the ECJ or ECtHR models, but intentionally embed international law into domestic
legal orders, such as the OHADA system discussed later. One could also see the International
Criminal Court (ICC) system as using an embedded approach where countries are supposed to
adopt national war crimes statutes so that either domestic judges or the ICC can prosecute war
criminals.

Table 1: ECJ Copies (ordered by the year the court was established)
International Court

ECJ (1952)

Supranational
Commission can raise
non-compliance suits

Preliminary ruling
system of national
court referrals

Explicit
administrative
review authority

Explicit
constitutional
review authority

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Benelux court (BCJ) (1974)
Andean Tribunal of Justice
(ATJ) (1984)

X

Central American Court of
Justice (CACJ) (1992)
European Free Trade Area
Court (EFTAC) (1994)

X

Advisory
Opinions Only

X

West African Economic and
Monetary Union (WAEMU)
(1995)

X

X

X

X

Common Market for East
African States (COMESA) (1998)

X

X

X

X

Central African Monetary
Community (CEMAC)(1999)

X

X

X

X

East African Community Court
(EACJ) (2001)

X

X

X

X

Currently under
discussion

X

X

Court of Justice of the Economic
Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) (2002)

X

X

X

Southern African Development
Community (SADC) (2007)

X

X

Total ICs with this feature
(including ECJ)

9

10

Caribbean Court of Justice
(CCJ) (2004)

X
11

10

ECJ copies were created after the ECJ’s legal revolution, with twenty-twenty hindsight.
Table 2 identifies key differences in the design of the ECJ copies, focusing on the preliminary
ruling mechanism and the non-compliance procedure. Even though the Benelux Court (created in
1974) copied a fairly inactive ECJ, the creators of the Benelux Court nonetheless felt the need to
state that the court could only respond to questions posed to it. Starting in the 1980s, emulators
court. The ECOWAS system (created in 2005) emulates today’s version of the ECtHR where private parties can appeal
cases directly to the court.
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had an even better sense of the activism of the ECJ. Some of the emulators wrote into their
court’s founding treaties provisions designed to limit judicial activism. For example a number of
ECJ copies make national court references optional.4 Others require the consent of supranational
political bodies before non-compliance cases can proceed to the court. Some emulators, however,
have designs that are in theory even more politically intrusive than the ECJ. For example, the
COMESA system explicitly allows its IC to review the validity of community and national acts
and the SADC, CEMAC and ATJ systems allow private actors to bring disputes with states
directly to the court. Some ECJ copies explicitly incorporate the direct effect and supremacy of
community law, and include requirements for national judges to respect the rulings of the
community court; others come with this understanding attached. There are some variations in the
system of remedies, but the embedded law approach tends to rely on national court enforcement
rather than sanctions to induce compliance.

4

It is not clear that an ‘obligation’ to refer cases makes much of a difference either way, as national judges are able to
generate reasons not to refer cases.

9

Table 2: Design variations in translating ECJ Model (ordered by year the court was created)
IC
5

ECJ (1958)

Preliminary Ruling Mechanism

Noncompliance procedure and remedies for noncompliance

National courts can refer questions of interpretation to the
ECJ, and courts of last instance must refer questions to the
ECJ.

The European Commission monitors compliance and works with states to
address noncompliance complaints. If noncompliance persists, the
Commission brings the case to the ECJ. Since the coming into force of the
Maastricht Treaty (1993), states that ignore ECJ rulings can face hefty fines.
There are also judge-made rules about state liability for failing to promptly
and correctly implement European directives.

Benelux Court (1974) 6 Same as the ECJ, but the Benelux court can only respond
to the question posed to it.

Not applicable in part because all Benelux states were in the European
Economic Community, but there may be state liabilities for state errors that
harm individuals.

Andean Tribunal of
Justice (ATJ)(1984) 7

Same as ECJ, but the ATJ’s interpretation must be limited
to specifying the contents and scope of the Andean law.
Since 1996, the ATJ can consider the facts that are
“essential for the requested interpretation.”

At first the supranational monitoring body could only investigate complaints
raised by other states. Since 1996, private actors are authorized to bring
noncompliance cases to the Secretary General, and if necessary directly to
the ATJ. The Andean system allows WTO style retaliation sanctions for
ongoing noncompliance.

Central American
Court of Justice
(CACJ)(1992) 8

The court can hear preliminary ruling references, but
national judges are not obliged to refer cases.

The Court can hear noncompliance cases, including cases raised by affected
private litigants, but there is no supranational body monitoring state
compliance. No remedies specified.

European Free Trade
Area Court
(EFTAC)(1994) 9

National court references give rise to advisory opinions
only.

Noncompliance procedure is the same as the ECJ. The Surveillance
Authority can impose unspecified penalties.

West African
Economic and
Monetary Union

Same as ECJ. Court rulings are explicitly made binding
on national judges and administrators and the
Commission can seize the Court if it suspects that a

Noncompliance procedure is the same as the ECJ. Political bodies may
agree to additional unspecified sanctions for ongoing noncompliance.

5

Articles 234, 228 and 229 of the Consolidated Treaty Establishing the European Community Treaty establishing the European Community (Official Journal C
325 of 24 December 2002.) The ECJ’s Francovich Doctrine created state liabilities for damages due to national non-implementation of European law (see:
Andrea Francovich and Others v. Italian Republic, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 and C-9/90, [1991] ECR I-5357.)
6
Article 6 of the Treaty Establishing the Benelux Court, March 31, 1965; modified via protocols June 10, 1981 and November 23 1984. The Treaty Establishing the
Benelux Economic Union 381 U.N.T.S. 165 (1960).
7
Article 34, 23-25 and 27 of Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement (Amended by the Cochabamba Protocol).
http://www.comunidadandina.org/INGLES/normativa/ande_trie2.htm. For more on how the Andean system changed over time see: (Alter et al. 2011c)
8
Article 22 (k) and (b) of the Statute of the Central American Court of Justice 34 I.L.M. 921 (1995). For more see: (Nyman Metcalf et al. 2005: 62)
9
Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice. OJ L 344, 31.1.1994 Article 19 and 35. The
Surveillance authority is explicitly obligated to ensure that procurement rules, state aid rules and competition rules are respected (see Articles 22-26).
10
Protocol 1 article 8, 13, 5 and 14 and Article 74 Treaty Establishing the West African Economic and Monetary Union and Additional Protocol No. 1 relative to the
Organs of Control of WAEMU (UEMOA). Done in Dakar, Senegal on January 10, 1994 available at http://www.aict-
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(WAEMU) (1995)10

national court has failed to refer a case.

Common Market for
East African States
(COMESA) (1998) 11

Same as ECJ except that references are only mandatory if
they are “deemed necessary.” The treaty clearly states that
Community Court decisions have precedence over
national court decisions on similar matters.

A Council of States must agree before legal violations are referred to the
Court. The Court may prescribe unspecified penalties it deems necessary
should parties not implement its ruling.

Central African
Same as ECJ. The Treaty explicitly states that CEMAC
Monetary Community rulings are binding on national administrative authorities
(CEMAC) (1999)12
and judges.

Noncompliance procedure is the same as the ECJ. The treaty also allows any
organ of CEMAC and any person to raise a case alleging that a member
state has misinterpreted the treaty or subsequent conventions. A Council of
the Heads of States can be convened to authorize additional unspecified
sanctions for ongoing noncompliance.

East African
Community Court
(EACJ) (2001) 13

National courts only need refer to the EACJ cases where
it considers an answer to the question is necessary for it to
deliver a judgment. The treaty clearly states that EACJ
decisions have precedence over national court decisions
on similar matters.

The Secretary General first refers noncompliance cases to a Council of
States. If the Council does not resolve the matter, they will direct the
General Secretary to refer the matter to the court. No remedies are specified.

Caribbean Court of
Justice (CCJ) (2004) 14

National courts only need refer to the CCJ cases where it
considers that an answer to the question is necessary for it
to deliver a judgment.

There is no noncompliance provision, although this system is new and
evolving. The CCJ can agree to let private actors raise cases, but subject to
conditions one of which is that member states declined to raise the suit
themselves.

Court of Justice of the The Court has jurisdiction over any national proceeding
Economic Community referred to it, but there is no requirement that national
of West African States judges refer cases.
15
(ECOWAS) (2002)

Member states can bring noncompliance actions on behalf of their citizens.
The supplementary protocol of 2005 allows the Commission to also raise
noncompliance suits. The treaty allows the suspension of Community loans,
assistance, appointment to posts, and voting rights as a remedy for
noncompliance. As the case study discusses, the ECOWAS court can hear
private appeals regarding human rights violations.

Southern African
Development
Community (SADC)
(2007) 16

There is no monitoring commission, but private actors can bring
noncompliance suits after domestic remedies are exhausted. SADC includes
a parallel inter-state dispute resolution system that is modeled on the WTO
system.

The Court has jurisdiction over any national proceeding
referred to it, but there is no requirement that national
judges refer cases.

ctia.org/courts_subreg/waemu/waemu_docs.html
11
Articles 29, 25.3, 30 and 34 of the Treaty Establishing the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa. Available in (Ebobrah et al. 2010: 3).
12
Articles 17 and 18, 19 and 16 of the Convention Governing the Court of Justice of the CEMAC (July 5, 1996) available at http://www.aictctia.org/courts_subreg/cemac/cemac_docs.html
13
Articles 33 and 34, and 29 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (Chapter 8) available in (Ebobrah et al. 2010: 37)
14
Article XIV and Article XXIV of the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice (http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/court_instruments.html).
15
Article 9 and 10 of the Supplementary Protocol Amending the Protocol of the Relating to the Community Court of Justice and Article 77 of the Revised Treaty
for the Establishment of the Economic Community of West African States. Available in (Ebobrah et al. 2010: 194-201)
16
Article 16, 15 and 18 respectively of the Declaration and Treaty Establishing the Southern African Development Community, Protocol on Tribunal and Rules
of Procedure thereof (2000/2001). Available in: (Ebobrah et al. 2010: 339 and 383).
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Litigation Patterns Across European Style International Courts
The ECJ emulations are not just paper entities. Together they have issued over 2100
binding legal rulings. Graphs 2&3 below focuses the first twenty years of judicial activity of the
international economic courts for which I could find data, dividing courts based on whether they
are European style systems that allow national courts to dialogue with supranational courts and
non-state actors to initiate litigation or WTO style inter-state dispute resolution bodies.17 To
capture the reality that building legal authority takes time, I compare ICs by age, taking the first
year that the court issued a ruling as the first year of effective operation and counting years of
operation from there (the legend indicates when the IC was formally created and when it issued
its first ruling). Litigation rates end based on the age of the system; for example the OHADA
system created in 1998 generates only twelve years of data. I combine data for the similarly
designed North American Free Trade Area and the US/Canada Free Trade Area but include the
GATT system and the WTO system as separate entries; the GATT system lacked compulsory
jurisdiction whereas the WTO system (1994-present) has compulsory jurisdiction (and more
rules to be applied, and more member states).

17

The counting is conservative; I exclude staff disputes and omit interim rulings. GATT/WTO includes panel rulings;
ASEAN is yet to resolve any disputes; Mercosur data includes only rulings of the permanent court (there are also 10
binding ad hoc rulings, but I cannot tell what year these rulings were issued.)
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Graphs 2&3: Litigation Rates by IC Age (1 =first year court issued a ruling)

*Reporting of and then actual litigation rates for OHADA declined due to unrest in the Ivory Coast, where the court
is located. As of 2010, there are no new appointments and the SADC Tribunal may not accept new cases.

These comparisons are crude; they do not take into account numbers of member states in each
system or the extent of member state trade. Still, they are revealing. The graphs show that more
active ECJ style courts tend to be busier than WTO style courts, with the busiest ECJ style courts
being the ATJ, Benelux, OHADA and EFTAC, which oversee fairly detailed secondary
13

legislation. They show that many ECJ and WTO style ICs are clustered at the bottom of the
graph. I suspect that copying the ECJ design is neither necessary nor sufficient for an IC to be
active because the extent of secondary legislation may be more important in shaping both trade
and litigation rates. I lack space to consider an equally important question; whether or not
European-style courts emulate the ECJ’s penchant for building law that furthers economic and
legal integration. I have considered this issue with respect to the ATJ elsewhere (Alter et al. 2010
; Alter et al. 2011b).

Explaining Emulation: Two Case Studies
It is easy to see a revealed preference to emulate the ECJ. Explaining this preference is
harder. We can see that common market systems tend to emulate the ECJ, whereas free trade
systems tend to copy the WTO model. One can thus surmise that the ECJ model is a better fit for
common market systems where states intend to create secondary implementing legislation that
domestic actors will be applying. But not all regional common market systems create a
supranational court.18
One can fairly easily eliminate some of Borzel and Risse’s potential explanations (in this
volume). There is no evidence of coercion influencing the adoption of European style ICs. The
EU supports initiatives related to regional legal systems in Africa and Latin America,19 but I
have found no evidence that the EU uses support to pressure regions to copy their model.
Socialization also does not explain the diffusion of European-style ICs. The ECJ is clearly seen
as a successful supranational court that has furthered regional integration through its many
rulings. Lawyers and judges in regional systems regularly look to the ECJ and its doctrines as a
guide; indeed one can easily find citations to ECJ rulings in the legal rulings of European-style
ICs. But the ECJ’s doctrines are in no way considered legally authoritative outside of Europe.
Blind mimicry also does not explain ECJ emulation. As Table 2 revealed, most ECJ copies have
adapted the ECJ model.
The best I can say by way of explanation is that the European model appears to
supporters as a way to promote law compliance and perhaps spur integration through law. Pro18

The Central American Common Market proposed creating an ECJ style court around the same time as the Andean
Community but did not follow the recommendation (Saldias 2010: 12); the African Union, ECCIS and Mercosur have
indicated a desire to build a common market, and there are existing recommendations for ECJ style ICs.
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For example, the EU provides in-kind consultants, sponsors conferences and exchanges among judges, subsidizes
projects to support fledgling regional legal systems such as web pages and outreach for regional ICs.
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integration advocates tend to lobby for ECJ style courts, making it fairly easy to find official and
unofficial proposals for ECJ style ICs in many if not most regional systems. These proposals,
which are often proffered by people inspired by the European model, can languish for years. My
studies of the Andean and ECOWAS systems suggest that governments may be more easily
convinced to create formally binding oversight mechanisms when they want to signal a
heightened commitment to market integration. As was true in Europe, governments also seem
convinced that they can avoid or ignore supranational litigation.
The rest of this paper explores two cases. The OHADA and ECOWAS systems, both
European-style ICs influenced by European IC models, do not directly copy the ECJ design. In
OHADA, the French government actively promoted creating a modified European-style IC. In
ECOWAS, actors were clearly drawing lessons from Europe and other ECJ copies, but the EU
had no influence over the outcome. I selected these two cases because while both systems are
young, they appear to be successfully mobilizing support constituencies to bring cases,
disseminate rulings and promote compliance. Another successful European-style IC is Andean
Tribunal of Justice (ATJ). Elsewhere I show how the EU model exerted a more direct influence
over the initial design and jurisprudence of the ATJ, with the mode of diffusion being ‘lesson
drawing’ as in the cases discussed below (See Alter et al. 2011c). Like the ECOWAS court, when
states wanted a more effective IC they adopted changes that brought the existing IC closer in
design to the ECJ model (See Alter et al. 2011c).

The Organization for the Harmonization of Business Laws in Africa (OHADA)
The Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA), formed in
1993, creates unified business codes for African countries. Its members are predominately
francophone African countries, all of which had anachronistic business rules left over from
French colonialism and adapted in a hodgepodge fashion so that few lawyers or judges even
knew what governing law applied. The result, everyone seemed to agree, was legal uncertainty
that was worrisome to potential investors (Mouloul 2009: 10-11).
The impetus to create OHADA came both internally and externally. Foreign investment
in the region fell in the 1980s due to political instability and the reorientation of financial
supports in the post-Cold War era. Political leaders wanted more foreign investment, and they
became convinced that legal and juridical insecurity made investing in their markets less
15

desirable. Adopting a common commercial code offered many advantages. By having the same
set of rules across countries, foreign investors could save on the legal expertise needed for each
national system. OHADA Uniform Acts were also adapted specifically for the needs of
developing countries, so that they became more attractive than competing rules—existing
French, American or EU business law (Dickerson 2005: 25-30; Mouloul 2009). Member states
may not amend the Uniform Acts, and the Acts are widely available on the internet and in source
books, providing legal stability and certainty. The promulgation of eight multilaterally crafted
Uniform Acts between 1998 and 2004 activated the OHADA system. OHADA’s Uniform Acts
are detailed, ranging from thirty-one to 920 articles in length and addressing a broad range of
issues such as commercial law, securities, recovery procedures, bankruptcy and accounting
systems. OHADA’s legal system was also one of OHADA’s chief attractions. Foreign lawyers
have little faith in Africa’s national legal systems, where judges are perceived to be ill informed
and often corrupt. International dispute resolution is an alternative, but it is expensive because
cases are litigated outside of the region. 20 OHADA created its own arbitration system that is
managed by the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) and it provides an
international review of national judicial rulings.
Externally the OHADA system was strongly supported by the French government, with
the encouragement of the Conseil Francais des Investisseurs en Afrique (CIAN). The French
government was interested in any solution that might help to stabilize the Franc zone, because
regional instability could generate currency pressures felt in France. A 1991 meeting of African
finance ministers from African Franc countries, held in France, led to the commissioning of a
study on the feasibility of creating regional business law (Tiger 2001: 23-4). The French Foreign
Ministry reached out to Kéba Mbaye, a former Senegalese Supreme Court judge and President of
the International Court of Justice, who in the 1960s had advocated legal harmonization among
newly independent states. The French Foreign Ministry underwrote and provided technical
support for Mbaye’s efforts, which led to the founding of OHADA (Katendi et al. ). France, other
EU and non-EU countries, and other international institutions provided financial support to pay
for OHADA (Mouloul 2009). While member states now also provide support for the system, it is
safe to say that foreign support has been instrumental to the functioning of OHADA. Also, the
French Foreign Ministry to this day has at least one attaché at the OHADA secretariat.
20

Interviews with two French business lawyers to work with OHADA law. 24 March 2010, Paris France.
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When it appeared that the soon-to-be-implemented OHADA Uniform Acts had been
largely forgotten, French patrons, with the support of funding from various international
institutions, created a non-governmental organization to promote awareness of OHADA and its
laws. The Association for the Unification of African Law (UNIDA) plays an analogous role to
Eurolaw associations, which formed in the 1950s and 1960s to help promote European
Community law (Alter 2009: Chapter 4). UNIDA helps with training sessions and maintains a
website—OHADA.com--that makes available OHADA Uniform Acts, and CCJA and national
court rulings applying OHADA law. The French journal Juriscope, with the support of
Coopération Français, publish commentary and compendiums of Uniform Acts and community
case law, which they help to distribute throughout the region. This is important because in many
African countries journals publishing laws and legal rulings are irregularly maintained and hard
to access. Members of UNIDA’s network regularly visit national courts to collect rulings that
pertain to OHADA. The rulings are transcribed and published on line.21 While the collection of
national legal rulings on OHADA.com is surely incomplete, UNIDA’s website supplies what
may be the only publicly available searchable source for case law in OHADA member states.
The combination of the Uniform Acts and international review of national court rulings
makes the OHADA system a “European style” IC. Why not create, however, a supranational
court modelled on the ECJ? One reason perhaps is that OHADA is intentionally different from a
common market. If OHADA had a larger political objective, like establishing a monetary union
or good governance norms, it would be in direct competition with the West and Central African
Economic and Monetary Unions, which promote economic integration among former French
colonies.22 Moreover, OHADA aspires to provide a set of business laws that any country can
adopt. OHADA is also primarily designed for business contracts, thus it does not need to
replicate the inter-state dispute resolution mechanisms of the WTO or the supranational
enforcement mechanism of the EU. The 2008 Quebec reforms have brought OHADA institutions
closer in form to the EU,23 but the format for creating Uniform Acts in OHADA remains
21

Interviews with a UNIDA staff member coordinating the collection and publication of national court rulings. 22 March
2010 Paris.
22
Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal are members of both OHADA, the West
African Economic and Monetary Community and the Economic Community of West African States. Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are members of both OHADA and the Central
African Monetary Community.
23
The reforms created a Council of Ministers that can adopt and amend Uniform Acts and oversee the operation of the
OHADA Secretariat and Court. The Permanent Secretariat manages the legal affairs and accounting, and it works with
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multilateral more than supranational. There is thus no reason to create administrative and
constitutional review roles as checks on supranational authority.
The existence of detailed primary OHADA law explains why the OHADA system is
more active than other African regional legal systems. But while OHADA law is formally
speaking the supreme business law of the land, and CCJA decisions the highest legal authority on
the meaning of OHADA law, much of the economies of member states remains informal and
thus outside of the sphere of OHADA law (Dickerson 2007). Within the sphere of business
adjudication, litigants may choose arbitration, and sometimes litigants choose to remain in the
national system instead of appealing to the CCJA. Also hindering OHADA is that national
supreme courts remain wary about working with the CCJA (Dickerson 2005: 57), and many
national judges are ignorant of the workings of OHADA. For all of these reasons there is a real
question how much of Africa’s business affairs are truly governed by OHADA rules.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
The original treaty for the Economic Community of West African States, adopted in
1975, included a provision that allowed for the establishment of a Community Court. An
‘Eminent Persons Group’ drafted the initial Protocol Relating To The Community Court Of
Justice in 1991 (A/P.1/7/91). I do not know if they considered the ECJ model, but clearly West
African leaders did not want a court that private actors could seize to challenge the many tariffs,
regulations and border closings that governments regularly enact to protect their national
economies. The Protocol, ratified in 1995 and formally entering into force in 1996, did not really
copy the ECJ model. States could bring noncompliance suits on behalf of their citizens, but the
original ECOWAS court did not allow national court references and the Secretariat had no role in
monitoring or helping to enforce community rules. Ratifying the protocol did not lead to the
creation of a Community Court; judges were appointed only in 2002. When ECOWAS officials
finally constituted the ECOWAS Court, member states made what in retrospect was a portentous
decision; in their expectation of a major relauching of regional integration, they decided to make
the new court a permanent body.24
The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (ECCJ) sat largely unused because states
the Council of Ministers to propose new areas of business law harmonization and to draft new laws.
24
Based on interviews at the ECOWAS Secretariat, 7 March 2011, Abuja Nigeria.
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never brought cases. The ECOWAS Secretariat quickly grew frustrated that judges consumed
significant community expenses without actually contributing to the goals of the community.
The problem was the Court’s extremely limited rules of access. One obvious problem is that
states would not bring cases against themselves. A second limitation was that few attorney
generals knew about the ECOWAS system, and mobilizing them to raise a case on behalf of a
private actor is not easy. The first case to finally reach the ECOWAS court was a private litigant
challenge to Nigeria’s closing of its borders in clear violation of the ECOWAS treaty. The
private plaintiff asked the ECCJ to engage in lawmaking by purposively interpreting its mandate
to overcome the ‘absurdity’ that expects a state to be both a plaintiff and a defendant in suits.
The ECCJ refused the invitation, sticking to the plain wording of its mandate that only allowed
‘disputes instituted by member states on behalf of its nationals against another Member State.’25
The ECCJ then used the ruling to lobby for an expansion of its jurisdiction. The ECCJ
printed and disseminated copies of its unsatisfactory ruling, and in 2004 the judges drafted a
proposal to expand the ECCJ’s jurisdiction. The judges asked for changes that would bring the
ECCJ closer in design to the ECJ model, including adding a preliminary ruling mechanism
similar to that of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).26 Instead, they
got something different. After the Court’s initial request, the future role of the Community Court
of Justice became a topic of discussion at a conference sponsored by the Open Society Justice
Initiative. Participants at the conference, which included human rights lawyers, representatives of
the West African Bar association, and ECOWAS officials (Nwogu 2007: 352), tasked the
ECOWAS legal secretariat with drafting a supplementary protocol. The 2005 Supplementary
protocol allows national courts to refer cases to the community court but it does not copy the
WAEMU provision, which requires national courts of last instance to refer cases to the
community court. It also allows authorizes what is now the Commission to initiate
noncompliance suits. A surprising outcome is that the ECOWAS court received jurisdiction for
private complaints against human rights abuses. Not only can litigants bring a case directly to the
court, they do not even have to first exhaust domestic remedies (Ebobrah 2007 ; Alter et al.
2011a).
According to participants, this change of jurisdiction went through with little controversy.
25

Mr. Oleyide Afolabi v. Federal Republic of Nigeria ECW.CCJ.APP.01.03 Decision of 27 April 2004.
The WAEMU system is a more direct copy of the ECJ model, and all WAEMU countries are also part of ECOWAS.
Based on interviews at the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, 11 March 2011 Abuja Nigeria.
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A member of the ECOWAS legal secretariat told us that member states “did not give much
thought to what the changes to the Court’s jurisdiction and access might mean for them.” The
change was also only provisional, a sort of ‘trial and error’ decision that states expected they
could revisit.27 Two things happened to make this change permanent. In yet another drive to
improve the functioning of the ECOWAS system, member states agreed to a series of
institutional changes that emulate the EU including transforming the Executive Secretariat into a
Commission that also helps to monitor compliance with community rules, agreeing to govern
through greater supranationality, and making Supplementary Acts a mode of amending the
founding Treaty. The ‘provisional’ Supplementary Acts thus became permanent a permanent
amendment. Second, when the Gambian government proposed adjustments to the Community
Court’s jurisdiction, the rejection of the proposals served as a political ratification of the status
quo. The Gambian proposals were actually fairly reasonable; they included requiring litigants to
exhaust domestic remedies and allowing the ECCJ to only apply human rights agreements that
member states had ratified.28 Both of these proposals were rejected because the Attorney
Generals of ECOWAS member states knew the proposals were in response to ECCJ decisions
finding Gambia guilty of detaining and torturing political opponents.29 While the ECCJ’s
jurisdiction may yet be adjusted should the court become overrun with suits, the key stakeholders
we interviewed consider the Supplementary Protocol to be firmly entrenched in the ECOWAS
system.
In ECOWAS, the ECJ model influenced modifications of the ECCJ. But human rights
activists trumped economic functionalism in shaping the course of institutional development.
The counter-intuitive outcome is that private actors can only challenge patently illegal economic
policies, like closing borders or requiring individuals to deposit $300,000 to open a business, if
such policies give rise to human rights abuses.
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Interview at the legal secretariat of the ECOWAS Commission, 7 March 2011, Abuja Nigeria.
See “ECOWAS Court and the Promise of the Local Remedies Rule” a Human Rights Brief by the Center for
Human Rights and Humanitarian law. http://hrbrief.org/2009/11/ecowas-court-and-the-promise-of-the-localremedies-rule/ last accessed 14 June 2011.
29
Chief Ebrimah Manneh vs Republic of Gambia ECW/CO/ APP/04/07 Decision of 05/06/2008; Musa Saidykhan
vs. Republic of Gambia ECW/CO/APP/L1/07 decision of 16 December 2010. The proposals were leaked to human
rights activists, who were then given access to the meeting where they were discussed. The human rights
reinforcements made it even harder for Government officials to side with the representative of the Gambian
Attorney General. Based on interviews with human rights advocates from the Open Society Justice Initiative (11
January 2011, and 3 February 2011, both by phone). This perspective was corroborated in interviews at the
ECOWAS legal secretariat, 7 March 2011, Abuja Nigeria.
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Conclusion: Diffusing the European Approach to International Law
The ECJ-model has clearly diffused around the world. The best explanation for this fact
is that regions are drawing lessons from the ECJ’s experience. What, however, are regional
systems learning? In the 1960s, many regions copied Europe’s approach to regional integration,
without creating supranational courts. Most of these regional economic systems remained
lackluster, failing to achieve their primary economic and political objectives (Mattli 1999). Legal
observers noticed that the ECJ was helpful in overcoming legal difficulties arising in the process
of regional integration, and they frequently proposed creating ECJ style ICs. These proposals
languished until member states sought to relaunch regional economic integration endeavors.
Adopting provisions to establish a community court became part of a package of reforms aimed
at making regional integration systems more robust.
Supranational legal architects also learned from the ECJ’s experience. Some regional
integration projects wrote safeguards to protect national sovereignty into their Court’s founding
charters, such as not requiring national court references or limiting the content of the Court’s
reply. But they also explicitly incorporated the ECJ’s revolutionary doctrines of the direct effect
and supremacy of community law, and the idea that “community law” is distinct from traditional
international law. Judges and lawyers working in regional ICs also learn from ECJ’s
jurisprudence, although they use this jurisprudence as a guide rather than as dogma.
Many local factors hinder regional ICs from following the ECJ’s trajectory. Most
regional ICs remain hampered by a lack secondary legislation that might spur litigants to invoke
community law and judges and administrators to work with Community institutions. Also
challenging is that ECJ emulators are located in the developing world, where national judges are
weak, reluctant and at times corrupt partners. The limited political and judicial support means
that ECJ copies resemble more closely in practice the ECJ during the 1950s and 1960s than the
ECJ of today.
While I have documented the emulation of the ECJ, I argued that one should not focus
too much on institutional copying. Europe has contributed in many ways to the expansion of the
global judiciary, by offering models of human rights, war crimes and economic courts that others
could emulate, and by being a constant force facilitating the creation and development of
international legal mechanisms (Alter 2011). The European Union does not need to pressure or
coerce others to follow its lead; the ECJ model has its own attractions and adherents. The
21

existence of ECJ copies allows us to hold constant the design of the IC, to explore how ICs build
their authority. We can take variation in litigation rates as a sign of varying demand for IC
rulings, which itself reflects limited social and political mobilization around community goals.
Wade Jacoby argued that institutions diffuse through a combination of external pressures
and internal mobilization. A coalitional approach to building domestic institutions based on
foreign models, he argues, tends to result in more robust domestic institutions compared to
emulations that are imposed or simply put in to substitute for what existed before (Jacoby 2006).
I have explored in greater depth European-style ICs where litigation rates are growing. Jacoby’s
argument appears to hold. Faithfully copying the ECJ is not as likely to ensure institutional
success than is building an international legal system that local actors find useful. Promoting
regional free trade is not necessarily locally useful, which may be why regional integration
systems lack secondary legislation and remain politically marginal. The OHADA system aims to
attract foreign investment, and the ECOWAS system increasingly focuses on promoting good
governance practices in the region. Both of these objectives are politically popular. The
dependence of international courts on national interlocutors means that ECJ copies may not
become lawmaking engines of market liberalization. This does not mean, however, that one
should count these ICs out. We may find that they instead become promoters of good
governance, and dispute resolution bodies for foreign actors that that see litigation as a useful
means to promote their objectives.
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